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1The Federal Food and Drug Administration's decision in 1996 to regulate cigarettes as nicotine-delivery
devices was one of its most celebrated actions in recent history. Newspapers, health experts, and the public
applauded the FDA for taking on the mighty tobacco industry that had resisted serious regulation since this
nation's inception. Many wondered, however, what had prompted this new course of action. After all, the
FDA had considered regulating tobacco several times before and had always declined on the grounds that
tobacco companies did not make health claims for their products, and that they therefore were not products
\intended to aect the structure or function of the body." While the FDA justied its change of course with
reference to new evidence on the dangers of cigarettes and the state of cigarette manufacturers' knowledge,
the agency could not have been greatly surprised by evidence of either. What, in fact, had changed was the
FDA itself { its leadership had become much more aggressive in trying to intervene and slow the devastating
mortality rates from smoking-related illnesses.
To achieve its goals of regulating cigarettes { especially the advertising and sale of cigarettes to minors
{ the FDA employed a exible approach. First, it adopted an expansive reading of the term \intended,"
examining the subjective intent of the product's manufacturers and the state of mind of its consumers rather
than the product's advertised claims. Once it established jurisdiction, the agency again took an unorthodox
approach, declining to classify cigarettes as either a controlled substance or a drug, and instead employing
a very exible reading of the term \device," to classify tobacco as a \nicotine-delivery device."1 Finally,
the FDA has delayed placing tobacco into a class of device, a move which would severely circumscribe the
agency's freedom to tailor its regulatory responses to future developments.
Commentators have diered about the wisdom of the FDA's specic policy choices. And the courts have
1Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619 (1996).
2not been receptive to the FDA's defense of its jurisdiction over cigarettes.2 But, at the very least, the
FDA deserves credit for stepping into a critical health battle that was thought to be unwinnable, and for
showing enormous resourcefulness and exibility in crafting a regulatory approach that was well suited to
this uniquely dicult problem.
Unfortunately, the FDA has not shown the same kind of exibility and far-sightedness in regulating products
that are targeted at nicotine dependence. These nicotine dependence products (NDPs) could be of great
help in the FDA's war on smoking-related illness, as they are capable of providing the treatment arm of a
treatment/prevention attack, that would be maximally eective in reducing the death toll of tobacco.
The Problem
Tobacco is the most deadly substance in America, accounting for one in ve deaths in the U.S.3 { more
than AIDS, car accidents, alcohol, homicides, illegal drugs, suicides and res combined.4 Tobacco related
illnesses claim the lives of approximately 400,000 Americans each year and it is projected that the number
will remain steady for \several decades to come."5 Scientists predict that close to half of addicted smokers
will die prematurely.6 With 50 million smokers currently, that translates to 25 million premature deaths yet
to come.
If there is any ray of hope in this bleak area, it is that pharmaceutical companies have had increasing
2A federal district court struck down the FDA's advertising regulations as exceeding the agency's statutory pow-
ers. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997). On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit struck down the entire 1996 ruling as inconsistent with the FDA's enabling statutes. See
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998).
3John Slade & Jack E. Henningeld, Tobacco Product Regulation: Context and Issues, 53 Food & Drug L.J. 43, 43 (1998).
4Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents,
61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398 (1996).
5Jack E. Henningeld & John Slade, Tobacco-Dependence Medications: Public Health and Regulatory Issues, 53 Food &
Drug L.J. 75, 75 (1998).
6Id.
3successes in developing products to help addicted smokers reduce or eliminate their tobacco habits. Since
the development of the nicotine gum in 1984, pharmaceutical companies have produced several variants of
gums and patches, as well as a nicotine nasal spray and an anti-depressant medication, bupropion, which
have proven successful, to varying degrees, in helping smokers overcome their nicotine addictions. In 1996,
the same year as the FDA's famous tobacco ruling, the FDA approved over-the-counter sale of one brand
of nicotine gum (Nicorette) and two brands of nicotine patch (Nicotrol and Nicoderm). It also approved
the sale by prescription of a nasal spray and vapor inhaler and Zyban, a brand of bupropion hydrochloride,
marketed as a smoking cessation medication.
These products are far less dangerous than the products they seek to replace. The most obvious advantage
of the NDPs is that they eliminate the dangers posed by external contaminants in tobacco products. In
the case of cigarettes these contaminants cause lung cancer and in the case of cigars and chewing tobacco
they may cause lip or mouth cancer. Moreover, NDPs have been shown to pose a substantially lower risk of
cardiovascular disease than do cigarettes.7
Even if one considers the nicotine delivered by NDPs as compared with tobacco products, NDPs are sig-
nicantly safer. Nicotine is a drug, and it is highly addictive.8 But the addiction potential of any nicotine
delivery system is a product of several factors, including the amount of nicotine dispensed, the speed with
which it is absorbed, the ease with which it can be accessed, and the product's sensory characteristics (such
as its avor and general use appeal).9 NDPs are preferable to cigarettes in each of these areas. Indicated use
of NDPs will administer lower doses of nicotine than cigarettes, with little potential for overdosing.10 NDPs
7Id. at n102 (citing several studies, which support the conclusion that \use of nicotine transdermal systems place patients
at substantially lower risk [for] cardiovascular events than cigarette smoking.")
8Id. at 81.
9Id. at 82.
10The exception is nicotine nasal spray, which delivers a quick dose of nicotine and can easily be abused by consumers.
4are also slower to work than cigarettes, with lung inhalation being the single fastest way to intake nicotine.
In the case of nicotine gum, to access nicotine a person must keep the gum in his or her mouth for a period of
fteen to thirty minutes, alternating between active chewing and \parking" the gum passively in the mouth.
With a transdermal patch, speed and dose are regulated, with the patch administering a steady low dose of
nicotine throughout the day. Breaking an addicted smoker away from the cycle of \craving-cigarette-quick
x" is a major contributor to the success of NDPs in weaning a smoker away from nicotine addiction. Finally,
the NDPs have less appealing sensory traits than do cigarettes or other tobacco products. Most have no
taste whatever, and nicotine gum is intentionally given a palatable but not appealing taste (described as
\peppery"). Moreover, there is, as of yet, no social cach e associated with any of the NDPs { to the contrary,
there may be a social stigma attached to their use.
It is because NDPs are less addictive in all of these ways that they can serve as a powerful tool in an
individual's eorts to quit smoking. As a result of the lower dose or slower release and the conditioning away
from the behavior of smoking,11 quitting is made easier. In clinical studies, treatment programs administering
NDPs have allowed approximately 20% more smokers to quit for periods of a year or more.12 And tests on
bupropion, one specic NDP, have shown that almost twice as many smokers are able to maintain abstinence
over a year with the aid of the product.13 These statistics lend support to the nding that between 114,000
and 304,000 more smokers a year are able to quit for at least one year due to the recent over-the-counter
availability of nicotine patches and gum { an increase of between 10-25 percent over previous levels.14
11Nicotine vapor inhalers are an exception as far as smoking behavior goes. Inhalers are specically designed to mimic the
hand-to-mouth motions of smoking for smokers who are unable to adapt to other NDPs.
12Henningeld & Slade, supra note 5, at 78-9.
13Richard D. Hurt et al, A Comparison of Sustained-Release Bupropion and Placebo for Smoking Cessation, 337 New Eng.
J. Med. 1195 (1997).
14Henningeld & Slade, supra note 5, at 101-02, n131.
5Given the enormous health risks posed by cigarette addiction and the proven ecacy of NDPs, the current
regulatory approaches towards tobacco products and NDPs are baing. Tobacco manufacturers, even under
the 1996 ruling, are able to label, market and advertise their products with great exibility, while pharma-
ceutical companies that manufacture NDPs must follow the strict guidelines laid out for the labeling and
marketing of drugs. Only two NDPs are available over-the-counter, while every tobacco product from snu
to cigarettes can be purchased without a prescription. Even the over-the-counter NDPs are only available in
pharmacies and large supermarkets. Cigarettes, though no longer sold in vending machines, are still available
at every corner grocer and newsstand.
As drugs, the labeling, marketing, and advertising of NDPs are strictly regulated by the FDA. The over-the-
counter NDPs are labeled like any other medication, prominently listing their active ingredients, indications,
and side-eects. They are sold in large white boxes, with little color, and no gures or designs. And
their advertisements must include a list of indications and possible side eects. Tobacco products, while
not allowed access to FCC media, advertise in print media, billboards, and storefront signs with alluring
photographs of young models, cowboys, and hip urban scenes.15
Perhaps most striking, though, is the regulation of health claims made by NDPs as compared with their
less safe competitors. Tobacco companies are permitted to claim that their products will reduce a smoker's
exposure to tar or nicotine based on a test that is widely known to be awed. The FTC Cigarette Test
Method was developed in the 1960s and is still used today to measure a smoker's intake of tar and nicotine
from cigarettes. The test employs a machine that \pus" on a cigarette a specied number of times for a set
number of seconds. Numerous studies have found that the levels of nicotine and tar measured by this test are
15The FDA sought to signicantly delimit the bounds of cigarette advertisements in its 1996 ruling, but those provisions are
not likely to take eect, having been found to exceed the FDA's authority by both a district court and the Fourth Circuit, on
appeal, for dierent reasons.
6seriously awed, underestimating the intake of human smokers who take longer pus and block ventilation
holes that would otherwise allow toxins to escape.16 Smokers, however, eager to reduce their health risks
from smoking, have unquestionably taken these claims to heart, with low tar and reduced nicotine delivery
cigarettes now accounting for approximately two thirds of the cigarette market.
Meanwhile, not only do such \light" brands provide \little or no health benet,"17 they may actually harm
smokers. Health claims of light cigarettes encourage smokers looking to reduce or eliminate their cigarette
intake to merely switch brands, rather than pursue medications or abstinence. They may even lead to an
increase in cigarette use, if smokers feel that they can safely smoke such low-tar or reduced-delivery cigarettes
without the concomitant risks of smoking. And it is now known that smokers of reduced-delivery cigarettes
take deeper pulls in order to compensate for the reduced nicotine delivery, which has led to a sharp increase
in adenocarcinomas of the lower lung among smokers.18
It is not only tobacco products that are given substantial leeway to promote dubious health claims for their
products. Several homeopathic medicines and non-restricted devices are marketed as smoking addiction
cures, and are not regulated by the FDA. CigArrest, for example, is a homeopathic medicine marketed
as a treatment for nicotine addiction, that is made from a combination of herbs, tree bark, and calcium
phosphate. Anti-addiction devices are also sold for similar purposes, such as a pick that ventilates cigarettes
so as to reduce their level of nicotine and smoke delivery. These products do not have to submit their
studies to the FDA for review and are able to make broad claims about their eects. A box of CigArrest,
brightly colored and labeled \The Smoker's Choice," boasts that the product \Reduces Irritability," \Reduces
Tobacco Cravings," \Relieves Nervous Tension," and \Helps Detoxify."
The contrast with NDPs is severe. NDPs have only been approved by the FDA as smoking cessation treat-
16Slade & Henningeld, supra note 3, at 49.
17Id. at 52.
18Id.
7ments. These products are not allowed to address uses other than absolute cessation. For the smoker who
is not ready to quit, who might be looking to reduce the number of cigarettes she smokes a day or reduce
the health risks that she runs without lowering her nicotine intake, NDPs are unquestionably safer than
reduced-delivery cigarettes and almost certainly more eective than homeopathic treatments. And yet, the
FDA has forbidden the labeling of these products for anything but smoking cessation. In fact, warnings
on the over-the-counter medications warn against continuing to smoke while using the product, eectively
telling smokers who are unable to reduce their cigarette intake without assistance, to continue smoking at
their current level rather than smoke fewer cigarettes with the help of a skin patch.
Moreover, if a tobacco company develops a new product with purported health advantages, it can bring it
directly to market. The development and marketing of a new health claim or a new NDP, in contrast, would
require onerous clinical trials, costing millions of dollars and years of research.
\Existing nicotine regulation aggravates the tobacco epidemic. It favours the most deadly nicotine delivery
devices (cigarettes) and places the greatest constraints in the way of the least harmful products (pharma-
ceutical nicotine products). This has given a huge marketing advantage to the deadliest products, thereby
expanding the tobacco epidemic."19
The FDA's uneven regulation of NDPs as compared with tobacco products is not the result of inattention,
nor is it the product of favoritism towards the tobacco companies. These policies result from a combination
of the odd place of tobacco in FDA regulation and conscious public policy decisions on the part of the FDA.
The inherent problem in this area is that tobacco came rst, by hundreds of years. With its heavily entrenched
position in America, a ban on smoking is implausible. The tobacco companies rightly argue that an all-out
19Henningeld & Slade, supra note 5, at n12.
8ban would leave tens of millions of addicted smokers with no alternative but to turn to the black market,
where they would likely purchase products even more contaminated than the ones currently on the market.
Even requiring a prescription to buy cigarettes would cause widespread havoc and likely result in a black
market. Thus there are serious limits on the extent to which the FDA can restrict the availability of cigarettes.
This has yielded the current situation where cigarettes, an admittedly lethal and addictive substance, are
regulated by the FDA as a restricted device, a category that receives less stringent attention than that of
drugs.
At the same time, the new NDPs are unquestionably drugs. They are \intended to aect the structure or
function of the body" as treatments for nicotine addiction. As drugs, the standard regulatory approach
mandates that the labeling and advertising of these products be strictly overseen.
Solutions to a Dicult Problem
One proposed solution to this admittedly dicult problem is to increase the regulations of tobacco products
at least to the level of NDPs. In certain areas this is a sensible solution, such as advertising and labeling.
If the NDPs have to market in large unappealing boxes and list their side-eects, there is no reason that
cigarettes shouldn't face the same marketing burdens.20 In other areas, this suggestion is impracticable,
such as prescription status.
The second route to parity, then, would be to lessen the regulatory restrictions on NDPs. If cigarettes are
an unavoidable evil, we should at least allow the products aimed at treating their consequences the same
access to consumers as the tobacco companies enjoy.
20Of course the entire eld of advertising regulation may be beyond the FDA's power, as the federal district court found in
Coyne Beahm, 966 F. Supp. 1374.
9The FDA has not been very receptive to this type of proposal. While three over-the-counter NDPs were ap-
proved in 1996, the FDA has not loosened the regulations on the development of new NDPs or the alteration
of existing ones, nor has it allowed NDP manufacturers any increased exibility in marketing, labeling, or
advertising.
The FDA's stance derives less from rigid conservatism, though, than from a considered policy decision. For,
while this paper has concentrated on the benecial uses of NDPs for smokers, the FDA has to consider the
impacts of NDPs on the population as a whole. All NDPs developed to date, with the exception of the
anti-depressant bupropion, are nicotine delivery systems. As mentioned above, nicotine is a dangerous and
addictive drug. And, while the harmful eects of NDPs may be modest compared to the eects of smoking,
they pose quite a serious risk to a non-addicted smoker who abuses them. Moreover, there is always a risk
that non-smokers, especially youths and adolescents, might experiment with NDPs, grow addicted to nico-
tine, and enter the world of tobacco. This is the real fear of the FDA { that products meant as a step-down
from tobacco abuse might serve as a step-up for non-smokers.
That fear is not wholly unwarranted. NDPs have certain characteristics that might make them more appeal-
ing to a youth who would otherwise not experiment with smoking. First, despite the warnings on packages,
it would be easy for a youth to assume that NDPs are fairly safe. They are FDA-approved medications and
some even sport the American Cancer Society's logo on their boxes. They are advertised as aids to health,
and often marketed with the tag line \ask your doctor about the benets of ." Even a person who
understood the potential health risks of nicotine might conclude, in error, that NDPs are a good product to
experiment with because they will be easy to quit at any time. Second, it is far easier to conceal the use of
an NDP than it is to conceal cigarette use, which emits smoke and leaves behind a tell-tale odor. It is easily
conceivable that a youth wanting to discretely experiment with nicotine would start with a gum or patch.
With such concerns in mind, the FDA has approached the regulation of NDPs as if it were a zero-sum game {
10to the extent that NDPs are made more widely available, addicted smokers will win and non-smoking youths
will lose. I will question this assumption below. But, even granting that in some areas of NDP regulation
(perhaps price) the benet of another one hundred smokers successfully quitting will be paid for with some
number of youths beginning a nicotine addiction, a policy decision still has to be made as to which health
goal is more important. The FDA has consistently chosen to protect non-smokers rather than assist smokers
to obtain eective treatments.
This choice may be based upon an ethical aversion to actively causing harms. The risks faced by smokers
who are unable to quit will materialize without intervention; but any non-smokers who become initiated to
nicotine through an NDP will have done so because the FDA actively chose to approve those products.
The more likely explanation, though, is that prevention is a goal oriented at protecting youth. It is thus
a strategy with great appeal, both public and political. Publicly, even the tobacco industry has come out
in favor of youth-prevention. Avoiding regulation of adult smoking also allows the FDA to steer clear of
accusations of paternalism and the public fear of an outright ban on tobacco. The FDA therefore emphasizes
that minors are a qualitatively dierent problem since they are not exercising free will when they choose
to smoke. \[Y]oung people do not fully understand the serious health risks of [tobacco] products.... They
area also very impressionable and therefore vulnerable to the sophisticated marketing techniques employed
by the tobacco industry...."21
Thus, the 1996 FDA ruling on tobacco is solely aimed at regulating \the sale and distribution of cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco to protect children and adolescents."22 It places no restrictions on the sale of cigarettes
to majors, and limits its advertising regulations to billboards in the vicinity of schools and magazines with
a substantial readership of minors.
21Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents,
61 Fed. Reg. at 44398
22Id. at 44396.
11Such policy decisions are sensible, if wrenching, conclusions to reach in the regulation of the tobacco industry.
But, when turning to the regulation of NDPs, the focus on the younger, non-smoking population is unjustied.
The FDA seems to have committed itself to a policy of cutting its losses, writing o the generation of current
smokers and focusing instead on inculcating abstinence in the coming generation. These losses are too costly
to bear, though, where regulation could make a dierence.
There are approximately 50 million cigarette smokers in America today. Between 39.5 and 46 million of these
are addicted. 400,000 of these smokers die every year { a staggering number. Perhaps these losses would
be unavoidable if addicted smokers were not interested in improving their health. But, on the contrary,
three-quarters of adult smokers report wanting to quit. Between 17 and 22 million make an attempt to
quit each year.23 Sadly, only 1.3 million of these quit attempts every year last beyond one year.24 With a
sick population seeking treatment, how can we fall short of making every eort to put eective addiction
treatment products into these smokers' hands? Studies on bupropion have found that patients who took the
medication for 6 weeks (while quitting) were nearly twice as likely to be abstinent at the end of a full year as
were patients on a placebo.25 Thus, widespread use of bupropion would be expected to yield about another
1.3 million successful attempts every year. And bupropion is only one of several NDPs available, each with
its own particular strengths and indications. Other NDPs have also shown favorable results as compared
with placebos.26
The public health benet of increased success rates among quitting smokers would be enormous. Recent
studies have shown that those who quit smoking reap benets almost immediately, and those benets increase
with passing years as the lungs and cardiovascular systems recuperate. A study by the American Cancer
23Henningeld & Slade, supra note 5, at 75.
24Id.
25Richard D. Hurt et al, supra note 13, at 1195.
26Henningeld & Slade, supra note 5, at 78.
12Society found that within one year of quitting an average person's risk of coronary heart disease falls by one
half. Within two years, the heart attack risk drops to near-normal. Within ve years the risk of death from
lung cancer falls almost by half. And within ten years of quitting the death rate for ex-smokers is similar to
that of non-smokers.27
Thus, the benets of getting eective NDPs into the minds and hands of smokers would be enormous. The
FDA states in its ruling on tobacco that \[I]f ...the number of children and adolescents who begin tobacco
use can be substantially diminished, tobacco-related illness can be correspondingly reduced...."28 What
they don't say is that this reduction in illness and death will not be seen for decades. The benets of
prevention accrue as adolescents and youths who might have otherwise taken up smoking begin to outlive
what would have been their reduced life expectancies { a prospect still thirty to forty years away. Two
scientists in this eld estimate that the payos of an eective prevention program would rst begin to reap
their benets in the early 2030s. In contrast, \the benets of measures that reduce exposure in ongoing
smokers as well as accelerate the reduction of smoking prevalence ...would be expected to reduce tobacco-
caused deaths within a few years. Ideally, expanded prevention, treatment, and tobacco control strategies
would be initiated simultaneously and in a coordinated fashion."29
Youth prevention is undeniably important, but, in focusing on minors, the FDA should not lose sight of the
enormous good that can be done in the coming years with prevention and treatment.
Flexible Approach To Regulating NDPs
27American Cancer Society study, reported on CigArrest: Smoking Facts (visited January 21, 1999)
<http://www.cigarrest.com>.
28Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents,
61 Fed. Reg. at 44399.
29Henningeld & Slade, supra note 5, at 77-78.
13What the situation calls for is some exibility and creativity in applying the law to a tough problem. The
same exibility that the FDA exhibited in regulating tobacco in the rst place, redening \intent," expanding
the denition of \device," and regulating in stages so as to reach marketing and advertising without having
to classify and/or ban tobacco, is needed here. With such a creative approach, the FDA could revisit NDP
regulation more productively.
First, it should be emphasized that the FDA's fears of non-smokers beginning a nicotine addiction through
the use of NDPs are not trivial concerns. At present, there has not been a developed study analyzing just
how great those risks are. There is therefore a great need for research addressing the appeal of various NDPs
to youth, both smoking and non-smoking, and the factors that correlate with use among non-smokers.
Second, even without a study, it is clear that some eorts to increase the appeal and use of NDPs will be
far more likely to attract non-smokers than others. For example, it would not be advisable to eliminate the
minimum age restriction on over-the-counter NDPs. Such a move would increase the potential for abuse
enormously, while providing a minimal health benet in the form of under-18 smokers who were actively
seeking addiction treatment without a prescription. It would similarly not be worthwhile to improve the
taste of Nicorette gum, which could easily be made to taste of cherry or bubble gum, as the slight increase
in acceptance among nicotine addicts could not outweigh the increased risks in youth experimentation.
At the same time, other aspects of this problem are more appealing targets for intervention. As was discussed
above, NDPs can currently only be marketed as smoking cessation aids. They may not make claims that they
will help reduce cigarette usage, known as exposure reduction claims, because reduced intake of cigarette
smoke has not yet been proven to be \safe" as compared to a person's existing level of exposure. For similar
reasons, physician package inserts and over-the-counter labeling instruct patients not to smoke at all while
using nicotine NDPs. Thus, NDPs currently present a stark choice to smokers { go \cold turkey" or do not
14use this aid.
Even smokers looking to quit would benet from a change in labeling, allowing smokers on NDPs with
sudden cravings to smoke occasionally. The numbers of such smokers is suggested by the relative success of
Zyban, the one NDP that is labeled to permit occasional smoking while on the treatment. Many smokers
are clearly daunted by the all or nothing choice that NDPs now put to them.
More importantly, exposure reduction claims would target those smokers who are not ready to quit but are
looking to reduce their cigarette intake. A major objection to exposure reduction claims is that the FDA
would then be approving a drug for the purpose of maintaining a smoking habit, albeit at a reduced level,
which can by no means be dened as \safe." However, the FDA has shown exibility in this area by dening
safety in a relative sense, as compared with the risks posed by the untreated disorder or disease. Thus,
chemotherapy is deemed \safe" treatment for those with cancer. In this instance, too, the benchmark for
safety ought not to be the non-smoker, but the addicted smoker. And if NDPs can facilitate signicant
exposure reduction, then they are unquestionably safer than no treatment. Studies are now beginning to
document the health benets of exposure reduction for heavily addicted smokers. An American Cancer
Society study found that, among fty year old smokers of forty or more cigarettes per day, cutting out
twenty cigarettes a day added an average of one year to the participants' lives. Among similar smokers at
age 30, cutting their exposure in half added close to two years to their lives. And cutting their exposure by
more than 75% (to less than ten cigarettes a day) added an average of 4.7 years.30 Thus the health benets
of allowing NDPs to market themselves as exposure reduction products could be enormous.
30Id. at 80 (citing David M. Burns, Estimating the Benets of a Risk Reduction Strategy, Poster Session at the Third Annual
Conference of the Society for Research on Nicotine and Tobacco, Nashville, TN (June 13-14, 1997).
15A concern of the FDA is that allowing NDPs to market themselves as exposure reduction products are
unclear. It is feared that smokers will accept exposure reduction as an independent health goal and give
up on abstinence. The problem with playing the all-or-nothing game, however, is that the statistics on
quitting smoking are not encouraging that \all" is accessible, or at least accessible on a rst try. Of the
17 to 22 million smokers who try to quit every year, more than 97% eventually relapse. With the help of
NDPs, the number of successful long-term quitters might be raised as high as 5 or 6%. Thus, forcing all
concerned smokers into a binary world of full-throttle smoking or abstinence relegates the vast majority of
those who try to quit to failure. And failure can be disheartening and discourage future eorts to quit or
reduce exposure. Allowing smokers to aim for exposure reduction with the help of treatment products would
place much more accessible goals before smokers and reinforce the notion that they can successfully exert
self-control and change their habits.
Another risk of encouraging exposure reduction claims is that it might provide a less-optimal goal for smokers
who would have been able to quit in a binary world. But with the great bulk of quitting attempts ending
in failure, it seems more important to concentrate on aiding the 97% { allowing them to smoke during their
cessation attempts and providing a realistic goal for those who are not yet ready to quit.
Finally, allowing NDP manufacturers to make exposure reduction claims is not likely to lead to any increase
in youth experimentation with NDPs. Thus, this is an area in which a change in FDA regulation could
increase health benets for smokers without weakening its prevention eorts.
A second major opportunity for productive regulation in this eld is allowing fast-track approval for NDPs.
This would require that the FDA treat tobacco addiction as a life threatening disease. While tobacco
addiction is not directly life threatening, a more broad perspective would allow the FDA to classify it as
such on the basis of the deathly cancers that accompany the great majority of tobacco addictions.
16Granting NDPs fast-track status would allow their manufacturers to test for surrogate end-points, such as
reduced exposure to contaminants and toxins, rather than clinical end-points, such as reduced risk of lung
cancer, in their clinical trials.31 The benets of this move would be signicant. It would mean that new
products, new indications, and new doses, could come to market more cheaply and quickly. New delivery
systems, doses, and products could be a boon to addicted smokers, many of whom have particularized
diculties in quitting and would benet from more diverse and targeted treatment options. Surrogate end-
points would also facilitate the approval of exposure reduction claims, discussed above, whose health benets
have yet to be clinically documented.32
Moreover, fast-track approval would make the NDP sector more appealing to potential manufacturers con-
sidering entering the market and more ecient for those already in it, thus driving prices down. This would
be an enormous benet to smokers, who face steep costs when they consider attempting to quit with the
aid of an NDP. To complete the course of treatment at a minimum dose level, a consumer using the Nico-
derm patch or Nicorette gum would pay approximately $222. A consumer choosing Zyban (bubpropion)
would pay approximately $125. These costs are rarely covered by health insurance companies. Admittedly,
smoking itself is a costly proposition, and a year of smoking one pack a day would cost about $900. But
the disparity between the high, up-front costs of NDPs and a cheap three dollar pack of cigarettes, can be
a serious disincentive to smokers, especially when they have doubts that the treatment will even work for
them.
Of course, there would be costs inherent in fast-track approval. Lowering the bar for pre-market research is
31Joseph A. Page, Federal Regulation of Tobacco Products and Products that Treat Tobacco Dependence: Are the Playing
Fields Level?, 53 Food & Drug L.J. 11, 21 (1998).
32Kenneth E. Warner et al, Treatment of Tobacco Dependence: Innovative Regulatory Approaches to Reduce Death and
Disease: Preface, 53 Food & Drug L.J. 1, 7 (1998).
17always accompanied by increased risks. But, in this instance, the staggering death toll of tobacco suggests
that fast-track approval for NDPs is appropriate, as it is in the comparably elds of AIDS and cancer
treatments.
Another cost would be that NDPs would become more attractive to non-smokers as their price fell. Here
the zero-sum fears are justiably raised, as, at some level, every reduction in price will risk a concomitant
increase in non-smoker demand. There are two mitigating factors, however. First, the price of NDPs is
currently much higher than that of tobacco products. In a recent trip to a pharmacy, I observed that no
over-the-counter NDP is available for less than $29. Signicant reductions in price would be possible before
NDPs became a serious competitor for the dollars of non-smokers. Second, should market forces push the
price of NDPs to a point where the FDA perceived a real problem, it could raise prices to an articially high
level through regulation.33
Conclusion
There is a great need for the increased development and use of NDPs in this country. A creative regulatory
approach, such as the FDA brought to tobacco regulation, could do an enormous amount of good.
In the eld of NDPs, as in every area of drug regulation, a new regulatory approach will bring with it costs
and benets. Some of these trade-os are outlined above while others will not, and cannot, be known until
the changes are actually implemented. Research in this new eld is urgently needed to develop our knowledge
of the eects of NDPs further, and to test fears and hypotheses about such topics as exposure reduction and
the prevalence of NDP use among non-smokers.
33One such option would be mandating minimum amounts of product per package.
18But, in the interim, as our knowledge advances, the FDA should not be slow to adopt the same aggressive
yet exible approach to NDPs that it has adopted towards tobacco. It should be a short-term goal for the
FDA to ensure that \each decision to smoke should present an equal opportunity not to smoke and an equal
opportunity to get help."34
34C. Everett Koop, Let's Not Forget About Helping Out Older Smokers, Too, Hous. Chron., March 15, 1998.
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